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Most African countries today are pursuing one or both of the following policy agendas as 
they strive towards a sustainable transition: 1) a global normative agenda moving away from 
traditional patterns of economic growth and toward a greater emphasis on sustainable 
development (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development), and 2) a regional context-
dependent development policy agenda that entails the achievement of a more radical 
structural transformation (Agenda 2063). Having identified these two overlapping policy 
agendas, both of which are aimed at moving away from an exclusive focus on economic 
growth, this article explores these development viewpoints with particular focus on capacity 
building in policymaking (the non-financial aspect), and the need for these to be further 
supported by more aggressive global partnership efforts (the financial aspect). By doing so, 
we are able to examine some transformation experiences in Africa as well as policy options 
that envisage greater inclusiveness, equality and sustainability. 
 
 
I.   Policy mix toward sustainable structural transformation 
 
Over the last five decades, several African countries have made 
remarkable progress in sustaining positive economic growth, 
while also improving their performance in social indicators 
such as health and education. Real GDP volume in Africa as a 
whole increased by 655 per cent between 1970 and 2016, which 
is more than three times the global increase over the same 
period of 211 per cent (Baek, 2018). The African continent is 
thus increasingly referred to as the new growth engine of the 
world as many African countries are growing more rapidly than 
high-income countries in the global North. Notwithstanding 
their tremendous progress, the ‘grow first and redistribute later’ 
strategy has been a dominant development paradigm. 
The experience of many parts of Africa, where radical 
economic growth has been associated with a number of 
countervailing trends, is instructive. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
nearly 70 per cent of jobs are considered vulnerable, and youth 
and women labour market participation is still very low (ECA 
et al., 2016) and while extreme poverty (classified as living on 
US$1.25 per day or less) decreased by 14 per cent over the 
period 1990−2012, a further 109 million people were classified 
as living in extreme poverty. This vulnerability in the labour 
market, together with persistent levels of poverty, suggests that 
much of the benefit of economic growth has been concentrated 
within small sections of the population. 
                                                 
 I am indebted to the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia for providing research support. My thanks must also go to anonymous 
reviewers for their very useful comments which have helped to improve this article. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the UN. 
 
2 Africa has recently experienced a prolonged era of de-industrialisation, which is evidenced by the decline and then stagnation in manufacturing 
value-added at around 11 per cent of GDP from 2012, while service sector value-added has increased since 2009 (Armah and Baek, 2018). 
A dominant economic development school of thought 
attributes relative underdevelopment in many African countries 
to a lack of structural transformation or the failure of such 
countries to significantly transform their low-productivity 
agrarian economies into high-productivity industrial ones (e.g. 
Timmer, 2007; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; Lin, 2012). This 
school of thought argues that structural transformation efforts 
should target a move away from traditional views of 
development and towards labour-intensive export-led 
industrialisation, rather than directly jumping into services 
sector development.2 
Therefore, many African countries have identified the 
structural transformation agenda as a development priority in 
their national and regional development frameworks. In 
January 2015, the heads of state and government of the African 
Union adopted Agenda 2063, a strategic framework for 
inclusive growth and structural transformation in Africa, and a 
strategy to optimise the use of the continent’s resources for the 
benefit of all Africans (ECA et al., 2016, 29). 
Yet, while Agenda 2063’s particular focus on the 
structural transformation aspiration often lays the foundation 
for high and sustained economic growth, it is still keenly 
debated as to whether it can bring about environmentally 
sustainable growth (UNCTAD, 2012). According to the world 
development indicators (World Bank, 2018), the rising rates of 
greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in sub-Saharan African 
countries, have correlated with rising per capita GDP over the 
Baek, S. J. (2019) ‘Cooperating in Africa’s sustainable structural transformation: policymaking capacity and the role of 
emerging economies’, International Development Planning Review, 41(4), 419−34. 
 
 
2 | P a g e  
past half-century. This correlation implies that as long as per 
capita GDP continues to grow, so too will greenhouse gas 
emissions (Figure 1). 
In a more analytical sense, the average growth rate of per 
capita emissions in OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s 
was greater than that of sub-Saharan African countries but the 
trend has completely reversed between the two groups since 
2000. It can be argued that sub-Saharan Africa has been able to 
sustain economic transformation over recent years through 
greater increases of emissions of carbon dioxide than that of the 
advanced group. 3  Given the relatively low share of 
manufacturing contributing to the GDP of many African 
countries, carbon-driven industrialisation has been substantially 
based on a narrow range of primary commodities, particularly 
natural resources including fossil fuels and metallic minerals 
(Schoneveld and Zoomers, 2015). The current transformation 
pattern in much of Africa may be environmentally 
unsustainable in this regard.
 
Figure 1. The growth trend of carbon dioxide emissions and per capita GDP: OECD versus sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2014 
  
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of the world development indicators (World Bank 2019) 
 
Structural transformation strategies, while maintaining 
environmental conservation, are closely associated with the 
normative idea of sustainable development (Castro, 2004; Hull, 
2008). Initially pioneered by the Brundtland Commission, the 
concept of sustainable development has emerged in relation to 
recent environmental challenges, prompting a rethink of the 
development paradigm. Agenda 21, the outcome document 
from the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, called 
for the integration of environmental and developmental 
concerns. Subsequently, in 2012, the Rio +20 Conference urged 
UN member states to increase their mainstreaming of 
sustainable development at all levels (UN, 2012). This 
normative idea was later institutionalised in 2015 in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), which 
reinforced all responsible and accountable governments and 
other actors to integrate economic, social and environmental 
aspects and recognise their interlinkages, so as to achieve in full 
sustainable development. 
Reflecting the core of the two agendas, each having its 
own development goals and somewhat different aspirations, the 
central objective of this article is therefore to explore several 
important questions. Is it feasible to simultaneously achieve 
economic, social and environmental sustainability in the 
process of structural transformation? If yes, what approach 
                                                 
3 Averaged (1980–1999) growth rate of per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions in OECD countries is -.253 while growth rate in sub-Saharan 
Africa is -1.225, which can translate into the .625 gap in averaged 
growth rates between the two groups. However, the figures (averaged 
2000–2014) are -.847 in OECD countries and .378 in sub-Saharan 
Africa, which implies that OECD countries have reduced their per 
should African countries adopt in order to maximise the 
synergies between these two agendas, given the limited 
financial resources for implementations? The following two 
sections address these with particular focus on the role of 
policymaking and partnership. 
 
II.   Policymaking capacity matters most 
 
Many African countries have their own long-term (50 years)4 
development frameworks aimed at structurally transforming 
economies, and moving away from an exclusive focus on 
economic growth (Agenda 2063). Meanwhile, at the global 
level, the normative idea of sustainable development further 
urges African governments to advance the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development (2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development; hereinafter referred to as 
2030 Agenda). Thus, a crucial difference exists. Agenda 2063 
focuses on the structural transformation of the African 
continent towards diversified economies with an inclusive 
economic and political transformation. The 2030 Agenda is a 
development plan of action for people, the planet and prosperity 
that is anchored to the principle of sustainable development in 
its three dimensions: social, economic and environmental. 
capita level of emission whereas sub-Saharan African countries have 
increased the emission level (mainly due to their industrialisation 
efforts). The gap in averaged growth rates since 2000 between the two 
groups has widened to 1.225. 
4 These comprise five 10-year implementation plans; the first 10-year 
plan covers the period 2013–2023. 
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Table 1. The extent of convergence between the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 
 
2030 Agenda (SDGs)* by United Nations Agenda 2063 by African Union 
SDG 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere Goal 1: A high standard of living, quality of life and 
wellbeing for all 
SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved 
nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture 
Goal 5: Modern agriculture for increased productivity and 
production 
SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all 
at all ages 
Goal 3: Healthy and well-nourished citizens 
SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and 
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all 
Goal 2: Well-educated citizens and skills revolution 
underpinned by science, technology and innovation 
Goal 18: Engaged and empowered youth and children 
SDG 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women 
and girls 
Goal 17: Full gender equality in all spheres of life 
SDG 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of 
water and sanitation for all 
SDG 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and 
modern energy for all 
Goal 7: Environmentally sustainable climate resilient 
economies and communities 
SDG 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment, and 
decent work for all 
Goal 4: Transformed economies and job creation 
SDG 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and 
sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation 
SDG 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient, and sustainable 
Goal 10: World-class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa 
SDG 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries Goal 1: A high standard of living, quality of life and 
wellbeing for all 
SDG 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns 
n/a 
SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts 
SDG 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and 
marine resources for sustainable development 
SDG 15: Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of 
terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat 
desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, and halt 
biodiversity loss 
Goal 5: Environmentally sustainable climate resilient 
economies and communities 
Goal 6: Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic 
growth 
SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all and build 
effective, 
accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels 
Goal 11: Democratic values, practices, universal principles of 
human 
rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched 
Goal 12: Capable institutions and transformed leadership in 
place at all levels 
Goal 13: Peace, security, and stability are preserved 
Goal 14: A stable and peaceful Africa 
Goal 15: A fully functional and operational African peace 
and security 
architecture 
SDG 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize 
the global partnership for sustainable development 
Goal 9: Key continental financial and monetary institutions 
established and functional 
Goal 19: Africa as a major partner in global affairs and 
peaceful co- existence 
n/a Goal 8: United Africa (federal or confederate) 
n/a Goal 16: African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
* 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) constitute the core of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
 
Following the global adoption of both agendas, African 
governments began the process of designing national 
development planning frameworks that are aligned with both 
development initiatives. The new global and regional 
development agendas are timely, but their implementation will 
be no easy task for African countries.  
In more detail, Agenda 2063 has 7 aspirations, 20 goals, 
34 priority areas, 171 national targets, 85 continental targets and 
246 indicators, while the 2030 Agenda comprises 17 goals, 169 
Baek, S. J. (2019) ‘Cooperating in Africa’s sustainable structural transformation: policymaking capacity and the role of 
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targets and 230 indicators, many of which overlap. The sheer 
volume of goals, targets and indicators embodied in both 
agendas thus suggests that the process of mainstreaming 
sustainable structural transformation into national development 
plans will be complicated for many African countries (SDSN, 
2018). Accordingly, the effective implementation of both 
agendas should be supported by the mapping of detailed goals, 
targets and indicators. 
There are indeed significant overlapping areas between 
both agendas, particularly in terms of their goals. In terms of 
target levels, the 2030 Agenda goals 2, 5, 7 and 16 fully overlap 
with those of Agenda 2063, while other 2030 Agenda goals 10, 
13, 14 and 15 have a low level of overlap (Figure 2). This goal-
level mapping analysis sheds light on the exploration of 
potential correlations between structural transformation and 
sustainable development. In this regard, achieving both agendas 
entails two overlapping policy goals and hence their 
simultaneous implementation in national development plans. 
 
Figure 2. Convergence analysis between the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on the basis of ECA (2017) 
 
Nonetheless, designing an integrated set of development 
goals still raises questions concerning how the prioritisation of 
the three dimensions of sustainable development affects 
outcomes in terms of structural transformation and vice versa, 
or which policy mix would have the most beneficial impact on 
Africa’s environmentally structured transformation process. 
Realising the aspirations of both agendas would thus require 
strengthened policymaking capacities to analyse the inter- and 
intra-sectoral impacts of policy initiatives (Willis, 2016). The 
interaction analysis is rendered more complicated by the fact 
that various intra-dynamics among the multi-dimensions of 
sustainable development have significantly affected the 
processes of structural transformation (Baek, 2017; 2018). 
Indeed, there are three potential trade-offs and synergies within 
the sustainable development domain itself: economic growth 
versus social inclusion; economic growth versus environmental 
sustainability; and social inclusion versus environmental 
sustainability. 
These multiple interactions have been recognised in 
relevant previous literature, but little is known about the nature 
and extent of such trade-offs and synergies (Saboori and 
Sulaiman, 2013; Spaiser et al., 2017). Without filling such 
policymaking capacity gaps, it is very difficult to examine 
Africa’s development strategies and whether these are designed 
to promote a structural transformation initiative or to mitigate 
the effects of trade-offs and maximise the effects of synergies. 
This is an essential area where evidence-based analysis of 
structural effects (trade-offs and synergies) of key policies 
should be supported by development partners (Armah and Baek, 
2018). 
One of the few studies exploring the effects of trade-offs 
and synergies between the three dimensions of sustainable 
development and linking to structural transformation was 
conducted by Armah and Baek (2019) using panel data for 
twenty-nine African countries for the period 1995−2011. They 
found that a silo approach that focuses on one dimension at the 
expense of another has a less optimal impact on structural 
transformation, which challenges the dominant development 
paradigm of the ‘grow first and redistribute/clean later’ strategy. 
Rather, an inclusive and sustainable structural transformation 
agenda would require tackling the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable development in an 
integrated way. These results were further supported by a 
structural equation modelling approach, pointing out that the 
total contribution of environmental initiatives to Africa’s 
structural transformation agenda is greater than that of a 
structural transformation agenda that is led by economic growth 
strategies. This econometric approach also explained that 
prioritising social development in African countries may be the 
most expeditious pathway to structural transformation. 
Baek, S. J. (2019) ‘Cooperating in Africa’s sustainable structural transformation: policymaking capacity and the role of 
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Furthermore, implementing both development initiatives 
would also hinge upon the institutional capacity for planning 
and coordinating interventions, adequate monitoring and 
reporting. In effect, the coordinated efforts of the cabinet, 
national parliaments, local authorities, academia, civil society, 
the private sector and development partners are essential to 
ensure smooth operations and effective delivery of services, 
monitoring and reporting. The lack of institutional capacity 
(coordination across and within implementing entities such as 
ministries and agencies), however, remains a significant 
challenge in several African governments (ECA, 2016). 5 
Therefore, efforts should be scaled up significantly to identify 
the most appropriate institutional architecture to facilitate 
effective implementation of the two agendas. This could help 
many African countries to explore policy options in an inclusive, 
equitable and sustainable manner. 
 
III.   The role of emerging economies in financing for 
sustainable structural transformation 
 
Recognising the need of policymaking capacity to integrate 
both agendas and then mainstream them into national planning 
frameworks, I now focus attention on exploring this from a 
different angle, namely financing for sustainable structural 
transformation in Africa. In effect, the financial resources 
required considerably exceed what is currently available. 
UNCTAD (2018a) claims that the total investment needs for 
developing countries to realise the 2030 Agenda are estimated 
at about US$3.9 trillion per year, with current investment levels 
falling short of that by some US$1.4 trillion. Given the 
additional need for financial resources to realise Agenda 2063, 
achieving these two normative agendas with a business-as-
usual approach remains highly unlikely.  
In this context, the third Financing for Development 
conference held in Addis Ababa, from 13–16 July 2015 was the 
culmination of a multi-stakeholder process that began in 
October 2014. With the aim of securing international agreement 
to an agenda for financing global development over the next 
fifteen years, the process concluded with the adoption of the 
(non-binding) Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA). The 
conference set out to measure progress and the challenges faced 
in the implementation of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and 
the 2001 Doha Declaration, address emerging issues in 
development financing, and to bolster the so far weak financing 
for development follow-up processes. 
The AAAA provides a comprehensive set of policy 
actions for the development partners to finance sustainable 
development, transform the global economy and achieve the 
2030 Agenda. It further offers a new global framework for 
financing sustainable development that aligns all financing 
flows and policies with economic, social and environmental 
priorities and ensures that financing is stable and sustainable. 
                                                 
5 In the past, there has been a tendency to consider immediate benefits 
above all else, for example the economic benefits of increased oil 
production were not adequately weighed against the possible negative 
environmental and social effects. 
6 The share of intra-African exports has increased, since 2012, from 
13.46 per cent to 15.47 per cent in 2014 and to 17.60 per cent in 2016, 
while the share of exports from Africa to the rest of the world has 
declined from 86.54 per cent to 84.53 per cent and to 82.40 per cent 
over the same period. Such increased intra-trade activities were largely 
Further to the ongoing global and regional development targets 
and objectives, the AAAA encompasses several new 
commitments by the development partners with particular focus 
on global partnerships. The role of global partnerships is thus 
worthy of careful review. 
In essence, the strengthening of international cooperation 
and partnerships plays a key role in fulfilling the specific needs 
of many African countries though bridging financing gaps. This 
relates to the mobilisation of resources from all funding 
mechanisms for the implementation of Africa’s priorities as 
defined in both agendas and further the areas of development 
that both African countries and their development partners 
should focus on, and how these can be exploited. In fact, the 
African Union estimates that an effective resource mobilisation 
strategy can contribute from 75 per cent to 90 per cent to the 
financing required for Agenda 2063. With this in mind, three 
particular resources mobilisation channels (i.e. trade, aid and 
illicit financial flows) are discussed below. 
The first, and arguably most important of these channels, 
is trade. Promoting trade with African countries is something to 
which many development partners have made a major 
commitment through various multilateral trade negotiations and 
forms of preferential treatment (e.g. Aid for Trade Initiative and 
Non-Agricultural Market Access) (Klasen et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, recent data show that the share of Africa’s exports 
in the global market has continuously declined since 2012 when 
it stood at 2.7 per cent in 2012, at 2.6 per cent in 2014 and at 
2.3 per cent in 2016 (WTO, 2018).6 This decline is partly due 
to an unfavourable movement in global commodity prices, 
which has a significant impact on investment and economic 
growth in Africa given the heavy dependence of many African 
countries on natural resources for export. 
The second channel is official development assistance 
(ODA). In terms of continents, Africa continues to be the 
largest recipient of ODA. Net ODA disbursements from 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development-Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) to Africa increased from US$10.4 
billion in 2000 to US$29.2 billion in 2014. As a share of total 
OECD-DAC disbursements, Africa received between 34 to 49 
per cent during this period, or about 43 per cent on average 
(Armah and Baek, 2015). 
However, most OECD-DAC countries do not meet their 
ODA commitment to contribute 0.7 per cent of their own gross 
national income (GNI). Indeed, in 2014, only five countries met 
their promised ODA target: Sweden (1.1 per cent); 
Luxembourg (1.07 per cent); Norway (0.99 per cent); Denmark 
(0.85 per cent); and United Kingdom (0.71 per cent). The total 
ODA from OECD-DAC countries reached only 0.29 per cent 
of the combined GNI, implying a gap of 0.41 per cent between 
the target and actual disbursements. Nonetheless, the increasing 
role of non-DAC donors has also been recognised.7 
benefited from the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement that 
removed tariffs on nearly 90 per cent of goods among the members 
(ESCWA, 2018). 
7 There has been an increasing presence of non-DAC donors in terms 
of international development assistance: it increased from US$11.8 
billion in 2012 to US$21.9 billion in 2016 (OECD, 2018). Although the 
share still accounts for 13.1 per cent in total, their development 
influence particularly in Africa is becoming greater (Mawdsley, 2010; 
Kim and Lightfoot, 2011; Gulrajani and Swiss, 2017). 
Baek, S. J. (2019) ‘Cooperating in Africa’s sustainable structural transformation: policymaking capacity and the role of 
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With this huge gap unlikely to narrow in the near future, 
the quality of ODA and the use thereof requires serious review. 
There has been a broad consensus that the quality of aid would 
have greater potential to achieve value for aid money, 
eventually maximising its impact on the structural 
transformation process (Kharas, 2008). This is mainly because 
such quality can reinforce mutual accountability and ownership 
from both donors and recipients, which has also been 
empirically supported by a large body of literature (Jones and 
Tarp, 2016; Lin et al., 2019). 
The third channel, which is particularly pertinent in the 
African context, is illicit financial flows. 8  According to an 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) survey in 2015, 
Africa is estimated to have lost in excess of US$1 trillion from 
the aggressive tax avoidance practices of multinational 
companies over the last sixty years (ECA, 2015). This means 
the continent is currently losing more than US$50 billion 
annually, which is almost double the annual foreign aid flow to 
Africa and equivalent to 16 per cent of the continent’s GDP. 
Notwithstanding underperformance in terms of financial 
resources mobilisation channels, the emerging role of China in 
Africa’s sustainable transformation has been remarkable; China 
has been Africa’s largest trading partner for the past four years. 
Trade data show that the volume of Africa’s trade with China 
reached US$225 billion in 2015, which far surpassed the United 
States, the continent’s second largest partner (Oxfam 
International, 2016). Furthermore, Chinese foreign direct 
investment to Africa is substantially increasing, 9  with more 
than 10,000 Chinese firms now operating in Africa, a third of 
which are in manufacturing sectors (Jayaram et al., 2017). As 
China’s search continues for natural resources to meet its own 
national demand for unabating industrial growth, even greater 
cooperation between these two continents is anticipated 
(Mohan, 2013).10 
Although Africa has gained much from China’s 
investment and engagement, Brautigam and Hwang (2016) 
raised concerns that, from 2000 to 2014, the Chinese 
government, banks and contractors issued US$86.3 billion 
worth of loans to African governments and state-owned 
enterprises. These two researchers argue that such loan flows 
result in Africa currently being significantly indebted to China. 
China’s African loans have skyrocketed especially in recent 
years, finally amounting to US$143.3 billion in 2017. These 
loans are largely classified as non-official development aid such 
as export credits, suppliers’ credits, commercial, and not 
concessional, among others.11 
As a result, around 15 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
total debt is to the Chinese government (Mlambo, 2019). For 
instance, Kenya’s debt to China is six times larger than to its 
second largest creditor, France (Chen and Nord, 2018). 
                                                 
8 Illicit financial outflows can be defined as money that is illegally 
earned, transferred or utilised. These funds typically originate from 
three board sources: 1) commercial tax evasion, trade mis-invoicing and 
abusive transfer pricing; 2) criminal activities, including the drug trade, 
human trafficking, illegal arms dealing and smuggling of contraband; 
and 3) bribery and theft by corrupt government officials (ECA, 2015). 
9 It increased from US$16 billion in 2011 to US$40 billion in 2016 
(UNCTAD, 2018b). However, China’s capital-intensive investment (or 
sometimes speculative investments) in African extractive industries 
reflects a temporary advantage in the trade balance of a few African oil-
Although this persistent debt burden has partly been offset by 
global debt relief initiatives, including Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief, these cannot by 
themselves ensure sustainable debt management (Armah and 
Baek, 2015). 
Recognising a potential debt trap, one way of fuelling 
Africa’s transformation while minimising the demerits related 
to debt burden could be to focus attention on the investment 
areas that best stimulate the reallocation of resources from low 
to high-productivity sectors. Of all sectors, advances in 
technology and innovation are most likely to boost the 
manufacturing sector, which could become the heart of the 
structural transformation process as well as sustainable 
development (Gault and Zhang, 2010). Mindful of this, export-
led development strategies favouring manufacturing sector 
development on the principle of comparative advantage 
stimulate growth which could, over time, cause sustainable 
transformation (Swiecki, 2017). 
Such targeted partnership areas should also be supported 
by interventions that take the environment into consideration. 
Various studies (e.g. Collier and Venables, 2012; UNEP, 2015) 
have claimed that, relative to other continents, the potential for 
greening the economy is highest in Africa. This is based on the 
assumption that Africa would willingly jump from fossil fuels 
to green energy if it were to benefit from the diffusion of green 
technology already developed in the global West. For instance, 
the experiences of Norway and Sweden suggest that developing 
countries could decouple greenhouse gas emissions with 
current technological innovations, which means that they can 
improve human development, while attaining low levels of 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita (Armah and Baek, 2018). 
Also, Africa would have a geographical advantage in producing 
renewable energy sources, given its vast untapped natural 
resources as well as abundant sunshine. All these would 
therefore put the continent in a position to leverage synergies 
between environmental and structural transformation. In fact, 
some African countries including Ethiopia are already among 
the global frontrunners in this arena. 
This discourse should remind us of the great potential for 
new partnerships with other emerging economies such as Brazil, 
Russia and India, as an alternative source of financing for 
development that improves the capacity for domestic (and 
regional) resources mobilisation. Negotiating new partnerships 
in a way that is mutually beneficial for donors and African 
countries remains a prerequisite. African countries should 
therefore proactively seek new partnerships prioritising their 
own development areas that could expedite structural 
transformation in a sustainable fashion. Meanwhile, African 
countries should also make an effort to maintain and strengthen 
partnerships with traditional development partners. Balancing 
exporting countries while rendering a greater disadvantage to oil 
importers in the region (Zafar, 2007). 
10 At the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, 
President Xi Jinping said ‘China will provide US$60 billion in financial 
support to Africa and the support will be provided in the form of 
government assistant as well as investment and financing by financial 
institutions and companies.’ 
11 Data is based on the China Africa Research Initiative, led by Johns 
Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, 
available from http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-
africa. 
Baek, S. J. (2019) ‘Cooperating in Africa’s sustainable structural transformation: policymaking capacity and the role of 
emerging economies’, International Development Planning Review, 41(4), 419−34. 
 
 
7 | P a g e  
between emerging and traditional partners could well be crucial 
in determining whether African countries’ efforts toward 
structural transformation are anchored by the principles of 
sustainable development. 
 
IV.   Conclusion 
 
Overall, several African countries have made substantial 
progress in advancing their socio-economic development in the 
past decade, but the benefits of rapid growth have not been 
evenly and broadly shared. As a partial consequence, many 
African countries have prioritised structural transformation as a 
development objective. This is reflected in two internationally 
agreed commitments: Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda, with 
the latter going further regarding environmentally sustainable 
development. Of the many policy implications, I chose to focus 
on those related to the field of development planning with an 
emphasis on policymaking capacity as well as on areas of 
resources mobilisation that can be improved by strengthened 
global partnerships. 
The first important insight gained from the mapping 
analysis is that the structural transformation in many African 
countries can benefit from an integrated approach to 
development planning, consistent with the global normative 
sustainable development framework. Africa’s development 
planning capacity, however, appears substantially weak; 
several African countries are struggling to mainstream 
development priorities and policies in their national planning 
frameworks (ECA, 2016; Armah and Baek, 2015; 2018). This 
implies a need to break institutional silos, thus strengthening 
sectoral (i.e. horizontal) and sub-national (i.e. vertical) 
coordination within and among implementing entities. 
Nonetheless, no analytical view on development planning 
would be intelligible without improved access to data, the 
reliability of which depends on the capacity of the relevant 
national statistics office.12 
In this new age of Africa’s quest for sustainable structural 
transformation, multi-stakeholder partnerships should remain 
one of the most critical financing means of mobilising internal 
and external resources, as emphasised strongly in the AAAA. 
Scaling up financing for sustainable structural transformation is 
required, given that this is no longer feasible with a business-
as-usual financing approach. The higher the quality (strategic) 
of the global partnership, the more likely the two agendas will 
be simultaneously implemented. For instance, strategic 
partnerships should focus on the areas that can stimulate 
economic activities through reallocating resources from low- to 
high-productivity sectors, especially the manufacturing sector 
in many African countries. For this area, emerging partners will 
need to take an active role in supporting Africa’s transition 
toward sustainability and its operationalisation of overlapping 
agendas. 
In the next few decades, sustainable structural 
transformation outcomes in African countries will thus be 
shaped greatly by both development planning for integrating 
multiple development agendas in a more effective way and 
financing for development through strengthened global 
                                                 
12  There have been a number of Africa’s statistical capacity 
improvement initiatives supported by development partners 
(Bédécarrats et al., 2016) – e.g. Strategy for the Harmonization of 
Statistics in Africa (SHaSA), launched in 2010 under the joint aegis of 
partnerships among African countries, and traditional and 
emerging development partners. 
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